If there is a lesson to be learnt from the past, it’s not to make the same mistakes again. This report aims to analyse India’s imposed blockade on Nepal that began on the 23rd September 2015 to 25th December 2015 with a focus on the way India and Nepal negotiated. The relationship between Nepal and India soared to a historic halt due to revolutionary foreign and economic policy from the backbone of the treaty signed “Indo-Nepal Treaty” in 1950. This coalesced relationship was challenged and consequently the tug of such curiosity by political figures led to the inexplicable humanitarian crisis in Nepal. Additionally, as a result, Nepal started to also deepen its relationship with China, India’s regional rivals. It was, therefore, adamant that Nepal maintained a neutral distance from its neighbours as part of its long-term strategy.
With the same year that saw the massacre in Tiananmen Square in 1989, political rhetoric and patriotic sentiments (Koirala, 1990) took precedence over issues in India that were transmitted to Nepal. The bread that was India, poisoning the relationship leaving a bitter taste in the memory of the Nepalese population. Whether a state induced crisis or natural calamity, the unprecedented blockade halted much-needed development and progressive relationship between the two nations.
The 2015 earthquake that struck Nepal was followed by a political crisis which halted the progression and recovery of the landlocked country during a natural predicament. The India to Nepal border checkpoints were guarded by police and customs officers. Supplies therefore to the country, was limited. Consequently, the earthquake and blockade had left the country in a dire state running on self-sufficient supplies, limited public transport and industries running on their last batch of supplies. As Nepal relies three-fourths of its trade with India (Bell, 2015), the blockade has revealed the vulnerability of being over reliant and reflected the dominance of power demonstrated by “big brother” India (Jha, 2016).
The bilateral relationship between Nepal and India will be poisoned by distrust for a long time to come (NT, 2016). With political instability mounting in Nepal due to the rise of the new constitution which was rushed as a comforting answer to the population. The nation faced a depending unanswered crisis. Patriotism and nationalism were the backbones for the negotiation as neither side wanted to “lose face” or “wave the white flag” while also simultaneously wanting to take credit (NT, 2016) for coming to a resolution to the problem they started. Nepalese government did little to intervene and the endurance fuelled by the resilience of the Nepalese population were tested leading to the rise in smuggling and the black market. My assignment, therefore, focuses on how the negotiation process, as an invitation by the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi occurred. Furthermore, using Ghauri framework will provide the indications for analysis and evaluation before coming to a conclusive insight.
Leading up to the negotiation, as an invitation from the External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj to Deputy Prime Minister Kamal Thapa, there were internal issues that Nepal was facing such as the growing class discrimination of the Madeshi people in the Terai region and the scarcity of resources coming in the country. Furthermore, the conflict of interest from different groups and stakeholders prolonged and polarised the relationship between the two nations.
Going into the India visit after the unofficial blockade was lifted, PM Narendra Modi invited PM KP Sharma Oli to attend “unfinished task” (Arora,2016) and negotiate talk about the bilateral relationship between both nations. The outcome of the negotiation would decide the future relationship that Nepal will be having with India. (Mention also when the ministry visit was)
Although there is no agreement on a common definition of international negotiation (Meerts, 2015), a recent review of the literature provided the following comprehensive description; “interacting with different players… understanding to try and reach a common agreement…” (Cohen, 2000). With a plethora of possible avenues for analysis between the two nations and to achieve any depth, I have focused on the framework proposed by Ghauri (2003). Additionally, a multitude of factors within negotiation has led the proposed new dimensions such as location advantage (Brown & Baer, 2011; Salacuse & Rubin, 1990) and psychological dimension with the emphasis on the perception of time (Zimbardo & Boyd, 2010; Volkema & Fleury, 2002). Taking this focus enables us to apply and discuss negotiation theories that have emanated from studies and, furthermore, apply them to India and Nepal’s negotiation strategy. The focused literature for this assignment will help guide and explain the process of negotiations and any common themes that can better explain how the negotiation occurred. Ghauri (2003) framework for negotiation incorporates three aspects that are fundamental in describing the way negotiation process are conducted. Although the dimensions will be identified, to address relatable issues, I have narrowed down the focus identifiable for analysis.
The background factors are variables that house, the objective of the negotiations (complementary or conflictory interests), the involvement of third parties, environmental (political, social and cultural milieu) and negotiators (the personality of the negotiator plays a key role especially if the other party is lacking in technical interpersonal skills).
While in atmosphere factors, described as the process that can enhance the dynamics of the process, it should be mentioned that some characteristics can be more dominant at one stage than others. Ghauri identified three inner dimensions such as the existence of conflict and cooperation (finding solutions that fit both parties), the magnitude of this depends on the objective and interest of and familiarity with each other, unfamiliarity results in perceived conflicts (Ghauri, 2003). The power/dependence relation is another characterises, which lies closely related to the power of the relationship and not attributed to the actor. The power relationship is perceived unbalanced if there is more power towards one negotiating side or if one party is depended towards another (Ghauri, 2003). The last aspect of the atmosphere is expectations which can be divided into long term and short term. Firstly, long term relationship is essential for diplomatic negotiations as it fosters a compelling interest to proceed from one stage to the next (Ghauri, 2003). Whereas short term could be to establish a good relationship or to provide nutrient for the other stakeholder involved, which in this case for analysis is the international media.
The last dimension, the negotiation process is split into three stages, pre-negotiation, face to face and finally post-negotiation. In addition, it has cultural and strategic dimensions. To put it briefly, pre-negotiation beings with an interest in interaction for the desired outcome. The interested parties will try to gather much relevant information as possible. Although it’s important to define the problem jointly, as a basis for collaboration, the process often ends in failure if excessive conflict is sensed or if a successful future relationship seems doubtful (Ghauri, 2003). Interested parties also formulate face-to-face negotiations, which refers to a solution, problems and preferred choice, relative to the other party to find a solution to a joint problem (Ghauri, 2003). The main issues remain to explore differences in expectation and preference and evaluate any alternatives for assessment. Ghauri examined that experience, especially from controlling partner, can emphasise their relative strength in comparison to other party’s weakness- therefore putting the other party into a defensive strategy. Having the “upper hand” can lead the host country to start a negotiation by discussing and agreeing on broad principle for relationships (Ghauri, 2003), talks, therefore, could be conducted overtly to create legitimacy in the face of media. Countries with low credentials rely more on social contacts being developed than technical and economic specification (Ghauri, 2003), therefore taking their time to disseminate words carefully. (1) This suggests a balance between firmness and credibility that display levels of maturity and legitimacy. Negotiators who have had prior dealings can pick up these signals easily than those meeting for the first time (Ghauri, 2003) (2). Lastly, post-negotiation stage occursafter all the terms of the agreement has been signed and agreed upon. However, trouble may arise if, implementation of the contract is drawn up with eagerness to reach an agreement consequently lacking the attention to detail (Ghauri, 2003).
Lastly, time as a factor plays an important cultural role in negotiations. Although two nations for this analysis are not exponentially differentiated (APPENDIX 1; HOFSTEDE), time has different interpretations. Time in this context I argue, contrarily, will be looked at from a different focal lens. Research from Zimbardo (ref.) theorised there being six-time perspectives, of which I will be focusing on two, being past positive or past negative. In line with this thinking, Fisher et al. (1991) explained that for effective negotiation there needs to be a separation from people and problems. Ghauri distinguished between bargaining and negotiation as integrative, carried out to achieve a win-win situation where both involved parties end up with beneficial outcomes (Ghauri, 2003). However, and paradoxically, parties aiming for the beneficial outcome will aim to maximise their own benefits, often at the expense of the other party, labelling this as “win-lose” scenario.
In the context of this assignment, it can be argued that looking at historical negotiation is key for comprehending the full extent of negotiation structures and evolving nature of negotiations itself (Cohen & Meerts, 2008). Otto (2010) describes the importance of appreciating empirical difference for effective cross-cultural negotiations. Ghauri also suggests culture as a tool and a moderator to complement his framework. However, although Ghauri recommends culture as an influencing factor, these factors are limited in within his framework. Therefore, failing to address the arrays of external factors that could affect the outcome of negotiations. In addition, personal negotiation also plays a role in determining negotiation success, a factor influenced by culture.
Culture might be “that which distinguishes one group of people from another” (Hofstede, 2001) or “group of people solves the problem and reconcile dilemmas” (Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1997). The role of culture has widely been acknowledged and recognised as being strategically different across stages of negotiations (Adair and Brett, 2005). It’s adamant to understand the importance and the applicability of how culture can shape negotiations. “Misunderstand is the greatest threat to the success of negotiation… especially if it’s something that goes against their traditions” (Fatlas, 2017). Incorporating culture has been a challenge as a variable for academics (Gelfand and Brett, 2004), although attempts have been made by Ghauri, only selective factors have been taken into consideration, therefore limiting the full picture. Furthermore, research by Lewis places culture along the dimension of linear active, multi-active and reactive (Lubin, 2013), although Nepal not being in the group for analysis, research by Khatiwoda and Manandhar (2016) has identified Nepal within the model. This suggests that although being in the same culture, the way the model identifies negotiation differs.
Together these factors present a circumstantial case for how culture affect negotiations, in literature, however, limitations do occur as the model considers national culture to be homogenous (McSweeney, 2002). I will, therefore, consider a level of heterogeneity within the culture for negotiations.
Objectives are defined as the end stage each party desires to achieve (Ghauri, 2003), classified as common, conflict and in the case for this analysis, complementary. The negotiator dilemma is considered acute for developing countries negotiating with larger countries (Jones, 2013) who have little clarity on their country’s interest. Therefore, refocusing the negotiation from a distribute (negotiation over single issue) to integrative (multiple issues) especially if government wants to signal personal enrichment (Brett, 2007).
Therefore, common wisdom suggests that it is necessary to be clear about the aims of jointly operationalising policies to obtain a bigger “size of the pie”. (Lewicki et al, 2010). Although Modi had been accused of imposing the blockade out of personal pique (Jha, 2016), both side had much to gain from a dealing with such misunderstandings (Bhattarai, 2016). India’s influence on Nepal’s politic had also intensified over the past decade (Ojha, 2015) due to political shift and changes despite accusation of conspiracy within Nepalese soil by Indian diplomats (Bhattarai, 2016). This has manifested a deeper anti-Indian nationalism sentiment towards the government as the blockade persisted on longer than anticipated especially for those who wanted to take credit for such humanitarian crisis (NT,2016).
Third party involvement
Due to the urgency of the negotiation and to reduce the need for conflict, ministers (Appendix) were sent to effectively direct and work on a solution causing the humanitarian crisis. Before any big players were involved, ministers were corresponding deals towards an integrative agreement, a move towards “collaborative bargaining” to obtain a “positive sum game” (Ghauri, 2003; HBE, 2007) – however, the outcome of negotiation ultimately, decided who “saved the day” where both parties wanting credit for lifting the blockade (NT, 2016), therefore, negotiation evolved independently on both side of the deal.
In the case for environment, political factor is the variable taken for consideration which influences the negotiation process. Nepal has seen a ministry change constantly (BBC, 2017) which can affect the relationship and trust for negotiation (Ghauri, 2003). Although both nations have a common complementary objective, a change in administration can deter the common path that agencies pursue (Jones, 2013). Furthermore, since Oli primary focus was to resolve the humanitarian crisis, his job was to also demonstrate his aptitude and the personal ability to deliver value to his constituencies (Brett, 2007).
Literature proposes that selecting the best possible negotiating team is one of the first vital steps that a country can take in its bid to influence an upcoming negotiation (Jones, 2013). This enables better understanding of the negotiation, it also forges good collective team spirit. As Oli was recently administrated into office, his team although beneficial for him, was at the disadvantage of having minimal prior international foreign affairs exposure (Appendix).
Perception of time
One of the new dimension I propose as an addition to Ghauri’s model is the perception of time. Zimbardo’s book, the time paradox (Zimbardo & Boyd ,2010), analysed two dimensions of interest for this analysis, being past positive and being past negative. I propose that re-occurring negotiations between two nations can be categorised within these two dimensions. In the case of Nepal, treaties have been occurring since the signing of the Indo-Nepal treaty of 1950 (Sinha & Ghimire, 2014). Although two nations have revised their treaty, India has seen much of the positive impact. India’s mass size and sheer economic strength give it the physical stature and psychological power to control the negotiation process. With this intimidation and denying accusation of India’s involvement in the blockade although implying it being the “second one” (SAHR, 2016). History shows the coercive “big brother” position of India negotiation that friendship last only when it suits to be one (Jha, 2016).
The history of being in the controlling position (APPENDIX) suggests that human behaviour can act on uncharacteristic actions due to being in an unfair situation (Volkema & Fleury, 2002). These actions can therefore make the invited party reflect more on past sequence of events to determine the negotiation occurring at present. Therefore, in these circumstances, India could capitalise on such behavioural scenarios, as they are perceived to be good negotiators, comparable to Nepal (APPENDIX). Being past negative, which in this case for Nepal, (shows?) has the characteristic of having lack of control, unprediciabilty and absence of feedback. Compounded further with increased anxiety and reduced conscientiousness (Zimbardo & Boyd, 2010)
Being a host/ guest
It’s noteworthy to consider the significant effect location has on negotiation, although an exception to the model I argue, that it’s the “missing link” to the dimension that academics overlook. Although the nations for discussion are neighbours, the practicality of this dimensions yields promising applicability to any context. Notions of location has been identified (Khakhar & Rammal, 2013) as a factor in Ghauri framework, however, elaboration is limited. Furthermore, location as a factor was identified affecting psychological climate, stress and information flow (Mayfield et al. 1998). Many sporting events refers to “home advantage” (Brown & Baer, 2011) suggesting familiarity with the surroundings and (Salacuse & Rubin, 1990) confidence over control in the negotiating environment. Nepal being invited to India, in an unfamiliar territory to the newly elected prime minster Oli, it could have instilled a depletion of efficacy and competence (Brown & Baer, 2011). In contrast to India, being on their “home ground” showed a greater ability to handle negotiation with a great sense of confidence. This negotiation analysis is visible when the two nation meet face to face for which the analysis will be drawn further into the report.
With many negotiation from a developed to a developing nation described as “common but differentiated” or “humble though contradictory (Brahimi, 2004), the existence of both characteristics is fundamental for negotiation process (Ghauri, 2003). Both nation have a complementary and common interest to resolve the problem with swift action despite the negative media attention mounting.
Power and dependence
Power is clearly visible and one sided in this case, India is deemed more powerful based on geography and economy alone. India has also been mentoring Nepal’s transition into modern statehood (Jha, 2016) and furthermore, many phenomenon are encompassed under the rubric for development. This synchronicity for dependency has the capacity to influence the context of negotiation. The relationship with the negotiator might be another factor for the disequilibrium of power. Inoguchi & Ikenberry (2013) quoted “doing business for business sake” – shows the negotiation as a legitimacy tool for India to sedate the curiosity of the more inferior nation in comparison which is Nepal.
With the notion of expectations, which can be categorised as short term and long term. Analysed earlier, as being essential in fostering good relationship between two nations to move from one stage to the next (Ghauri, 2003). Historic pattern of negotiation between India and Nepal (APPENDIX) shows how the importance of maintaining relationship, not only short term, but for a long-term collaboration can be. In short, the disequilibrium in relationship is compounded when media is involved, although the common relationship for diplomats for negotiation are done in secrecy, Faltas (2017) is of the argument that there is “no hidden door behind democracy”. In this case, the self-interest, Oli’s and Modi’s international relations and common interest, reduce the humanitarian crisis. Giving power and voice to the individual (Mueller, 2012) has also furthermore deepened the wound of the relationship between the two nations consequently due to the narrative of powerful media coverage (Jones, 2013, APPENDIX). The coverage of the crisis to mediate public opinion was emotional, therefore, shaping the negotiations true objectives. This “creative ambiguity” (Faltas, 2017) suggest how narrative becomes the currency for power and how “language is the currency for diplomats” (Faltas, 2017), therefore turning this from a political agreement, which could have been accommodating, to an “emotionally charged negotiation” (Faltas, 2017).
Since the earthquake initially hit Nepal on April 2015, India and Nepal were corresponding as a necessity. Considering the blockade, ministers were sent to find mutual benefits for information sharing (APPENDIX). Although the common metaphor for culture is described as an iceberg, Nepal and India are far differing that similar, therefore, culture need to be considered as shifting and not static (Hall, 2003). Although, common objective for both nations were to come at a swift agreement, India were not so committed, as there was perception that the blockade was backed by New Delhi (Pokharel, 2015). Furthermore, pre-negotiation was vital due to administration change from Nepal’s side suggesting continuity from previous administration will never be known (Brett, 2007).
Furthermore, discussed earlier was the landlocked location disadvantage that Nepal was in (MAP APPENDIX?). Moving to a country where the host has an upper hand, Nepal, needed to gather much information as possible (Ghauri, 2003) to be aware of their relative power and increase the chance of common expectation from the agreement.
Face to Face negotiations
In their book, The Definitive Book of Body Language (Pease and Pease, 2005), identified that it is better to wait for the other person to initiate the handshake or a small head nod. Modi eagerly waiting for Oli, as a sign of respect and tradition also known as “Atithi Devo Bhava” which translates to ‘the guest is equivalent to God’ (Discover India, 2017). This gesture is followed through by Oli tapping on Modi’s shoulder and a head nod, used to signify ‘Yes’ or an agreement (Pease and Pease, 2005) then a “namaste”, which is conducted as per tradition in Sanskrit translating to namah + te “I bow to you”, a spiritual significance of reducing one’s ego in the presence of another (Das, 2017).
And furthermore, when two dominant people shake hands it remains in a vertical position to create a feeling of mutual respect and equality (Pease and Pease, 2005).
This is followed through by Modi disarming the handshake by applying the Step-to-the-Right technique, cueing the other party to follow through and disarming his hand.
Small talk greeting:
The “double hander”, delivered with a candid reassuring smile and a confident repetition of handshakes. Sometimes called the ‘politician’s handshake’ (Pease and Pease, 2005). The initiator tries to give the impression of being trustworthy and hones. If it’s a new person then it might be perceived as distrustful to the eye of the guest (Pease and Pease, 2005). In contrary to Pease and Pease (2005), who investigated that the double hander restricts the defence capability and should not be used as a greeting where person bond doesn’t exist. I argue, that due to the nations close historic and religious traditions this factor can be overlooked – and in line with tradition, any guest in the host country are treated like old friends.
In the case of Nepal and India, the power distribution is perceived as unequal due to factors such as economic size, location and past negotiation of India. Host negotiators with negotiation experience usually control the other party, where initial discussion can create an atmosphere of cooperation between two parties. For India, this was to introduce other factors for negotiations therefore creating and agreeing on broader principles for a relationship (Ghauri, 2003). Faltas (2017) recognised this as “creative unambiguity” and demonstrating a skill of “talking the way we hate”. Oli on his speech uses positive language to describe the relationship with India:
“… we are linked by history, culture and geography…”
“… India has provided us generous development support… these… should be a regular between our two countries…”
“… We eagerly look forward to welcoming them. We look at Nepal- India relations with here forward-looking approach in the interest of our two countries and people’s….” (YouTube, 2017).
Additionally, party perceived with greater relative power, in this case, India, often make fewer concession than the weaker party (Ghauri, 2003). Upon transcript, Modi is clear and concise in Hindi about his intention for the country’s relations using little impromptus. In contrast, the perceived weaker party, Nepal, uses scripted English, showing a weaker personal quality for negotiation. On body analysis, the handshake from Modi has an open body and wider stance, a dominance signal to display a macho- looking attitude (Pease and Pease, 2005).
This stage describes the scenario where all parties have agreed upon the terms of the contract. Having done the negotiation, parties should not display eagerness (Ghauri, 2003). Doing so can cause problem and subsequently break the deal of the contract, if face to face recognition are to be renewed (Ghauri, 2003). Furthermore, many diplomatic negotiation that are broadcasted are a way to confirm and create legitimacy that the deal has gone smoothly. It is not the first point of call for negotiation, rather it’s done to sedate the curiosity and transmit information to the interested parties. In this case are the populous of Nepal and India. Furthermore, ministers shared the outcome of the negotiation on their preferred choice of social media platform, which in this case for Modi was Twitter (Appendix), thanking Oli for this visit and prompting a good long term relationship with Nepal.
I argue, that negotiation definition can have its limitation without fully understanding the underlying aspect that defines external variables. There is no doubt that in line with literature commonality can be found but this is due to selective research materials, which are, and can be, contradictory at times. If negotiation and relationship is an evolving sequencing overtime, then this is where the two nations demonstrate this. Furthermore, limitation of business case study should not be dismissed, “politics and business are no different” (Fatlas, 2017), therefore two completely “unrelated topics can become related due to politics” as “language becomes the currency for diplomats” (Fatlas, 2017). In contrary to literature, Brahimi (2004) is of the view that there is no “beautiful strategy” and that sometimes you need to “dirty the hands with not very nice people”. Becoming humble in negotiation can be contradictory especially if both parties are trying to increase their outcomes. Having a contiguous plan and understanding culture makes the host country coming into a new area the confidence to say “No” (Brahimi, 2004).
The negotiation for Nepal and India has been described as “complicated”. If negotiation is taken on face level the process was swift and effective. Due to the emotionally charged negotiation and external factors such as media playing a big role in guiding the outcome, negotiation can vary. Nepal has always been historically close with India, a reflection of their cultural, linguistic and political links with open border between the two nations. But there seems to be an increasing tug between the relationship, one of the reason being China’s involvement. Although mutual, commercial and diplomatic gain can be achieved from such proposition, it seems to be on the interest of self- serving independent nations. It seems that Nepal’s negotiation is always disturbed by external factors and the dominant power tactics played by India.
This emotional “little brother” and “big brother” act lies in the foundation fuelled by nationalism and at times, empty promises. Lessons learnt from the past should be a guiding component to today’s contemporary negotiations for which outcomes can be adapted. Of the most innocuous but nonetheless puzzling aspects is the attention that Nepal wants in return for India’s loaned services. Together, these factors present a circumstantial case for ineffective negotiation from Nepal’s side. This is not to say that, India is in the safe zone, the treaty signed in 1950’s states: “There shall be everlasting peace and friendship between the Government of India and the Government of Nepal”, unexplained to the public is the ignorance caused by ministry of such powerful nation like India, even at times of humanitarian crisis.
It is to be noted that most people at most times, don’t stick to the sage advice of prescriptive theories. I have demonstrated that although Ghauri’s framework is relevant for decision making, there are factors that are outside of control for negotiations. For a plethora of reasons, nations rely on their traditional “intuition” to make decisions rather than following rational prescriptions (Raiffa et al. 2007). But as a rule, negotiators do not prepare adequately, alone or together. They do not do their homework. They do not examine their fundamental interests or seriously explore their alternatives to negotiation. The analysis for this discussion has been based on material that are available in academic and public domain, however, diplomatic negotiation is conducted behind closed doors. They usually talk in private and are then obliged to discuss their agreements and victories to the public.
In line with research, it was hard to obtain data due to the change in administration in Nepal. This approach from governmental administration is a way to make a stance in the spotlight of their new position. However, from an academic point of view, it becomes hard to evaluate the effectiveness of negotiation. In terms of suggestions, it should be Nepal’s priority to learn the basis of negotiation and effectively delegate ministers who are effective and analytical at observing such continuity of relationship building exercise. Learning for them should not stop just because they have obtained a position that is deemed successful, at times positions in ministry are filled by family members and not technocratic elites. Literature should therefore, be the guiding principle in which assessment should be evaluated.
It should be noted that the author, of Nepalese origin, has chosen to take an impartial stance throughout the entirety of the assignment.
|Date of Event||Event Description|
|Monday August 4, 2014||PM Modi’s Special Puja at Pashupatinath Temple in Nepal|
|Thursday November 6, 2014||Nepal to Felicitate Indian Army Chief During His 4-Day Visit|
|Thursday September 17, 2015||Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar to Visit Nepal Tomorrow|
|Sunday October 18, 2015||Nepal’s Deputy Prime Minister Arrives on a 3-Day Visit to India|
|Sunday December 25, 2015||Nepal blockade ends, trucks carrying essential supplies from India enter country|
|Friday February 19, 2016||Negotiation Process : Nepalese PM KP Oli To Arrive In India Today On A 6-day Visit|
|Wednesday March 16, 2016||Sushma Swaraj Arrives In Nepal To Attend SAARC Ministerial Meeting|
|Friday May 6, 2016||Nepal President’s India Visit Cancelled|
|Friday June 10, 2016||Nepal Deputy PM to arrive in India for a three-day visit|
|Mon, Sep 12 2016||Sushma Swaraj meets Nepal foreign minister; both nations seek to reset ties|
|Thursday September 16, 2016||Nepal PM Pushpa Kamal Dahal On 4-Day India Visit, To Meet PM Modi Tomorrow|
|Friday October 28, 2016||President Pranab Mukherjee To Undertake 3-Day State Visit To Nepal|
|Friday November 11, 2016||Army Chief General Dalbir Singh Suhag Concludes Nepal Visit|
Map of Nepal
Timeline of ministers sent out
|6 Nov 2014||Nepal to Felicitate Indian Army Chief During His 4-Day Visit (Business Standard, 2014)|
|17 Sep 2015||Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar to Visit Nepal Tomorrow (All Press India, 2016a)|
|10 June 2016||Nepal’s Deputy Prime Minister Arrives on a 3-Day Visit to India (Indian Express, 2016)|
|19 Feb 2016||Nepalese PM KP Oli To Arrive In India Today On A 6-day Visit (All Press India, 2016b)|
Third parties in negotiations (MOFA, 2016)
|Prime Minister||Khadga Prasad Oli||Narendra Modi|
|External Affairs Minister||Kamal Thapa||Sushma Swaraj|
|Ambassador||Deepkumar Upadhyay||Janit Rae|
|Miscellaneous||Ramesh Lekhak (Ministry of Physical Transport)
Naindra Prasad Upadhaya (Commerce Sectary)
|Rita Swami Choudhary (Sangeet Natak Akademi)
Kundan Sinha (Advisor Traffic & Transportation)
Historic Negotiations between India and Nepal
|Year||Relation Title||Who had the upper hand?|
|1950–1970||Indo-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship||India|
|1970–1980||Renewal of Treaties||India|
|1990||Economic Blockade treaty||India|
|2000||Nepal-India Joint Committee on Water Resources||Neutral|
|2010||Political Instability Hydro plant||India|
|2015||Madheshi Economic Blockade||India|
International Media covering the crisis
|Inter Press Service||http://www.ipsnews.net/2015/10/nepal-appeals-to-u-n-to-help-lift-economic-blockade/|
Negotiation on social media
|Stage of negotiation||Date||India||Nepal||Source|
|Pre- Negotiation||11th Oct 2015||Spoke to Shri KP Oli. Congratulated him & invited him to visit India. We value ties with Nepal & want to strengthen them even further.||(Unavailable, due to deletion of tweet by new administrator)|
|Post- Negotiation||20th Feb 2016||Wonderful to have PM Oli and his wife visit India. Am sure this visit will strengthen India-Nepal ties.||Unavailable, due to deletion of tweet by new administrator)|
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