‘Power to the People?’ housing development and community engagement in a ‘tribal’ former Bantustan district, Vulindlela, South Africa

 

 

 

 

 

 

Table of Contents

Abstract

Introduction

Chapter 1: The ANC’s approach to the South African housing crisis and the legacy of apartheid in peri –urban communities

Chapter 2: Community engagement in Vulindlela, a fragmented peri – urban community: the product of the apartheid era.

Chapter 3: What can we learn from Vulindlela? Has community development been a failure in South Africa’s peri-urban communities?

Conclusion

Appendix

Bibliography

 Abstract

 

 

In 1994 at the end of apartheid era, upon coming to power the African National Congress party was faced with a housing crisis and deeply divided peri-urban communities. The many problems created by apartheid reverberate in numerous peri-urban communities today. This is evident in the violence, poverty and inequality that continues to engulf many peri-urban communities, particularly in the former Bantustans. After coming to power, the ANC has tried to tackle the housing crisis through a mixture of ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ development, with differing levels of success. Since the early 2000s the government has primarily moved to a bottom up approach to development (decentralised development involving local governments and communities).

   This dissertation looks at the example of the Vulindlela Housing Development project, to demonstrate how in South African tribal Bantustan communities, the needs of the people have often been overlooked and numerous ‘community’ development projects were monopolised by the amakhosi and political elites, who gave precedence to private enterprise over their own people. Bottom up development has failed in Vulindlela, because there was corruption from local elites and private corporations, poor service delivery and a lack of understanding of what the residents needed. All too often the local people had little or no say in development projects in South Africa, and many alleged community projects have been controlled by a few elites. The historic patterns of violence and corruption have created a precedent that violence and coercion are the route to power. However, when the community is so divided, is it possible to truly have a successful community development project? In South Africa today, the idea of community has changed. The Vulindlela example demonstrates the difficulties of engaging a fragmented community in a development project, and the disjuncture that remains between peri-urban areas and the cities they surround.

 

 

 

 

List of abbreviations

 

ANC – African National Congress Party

BESG – Built Environment Support Group

EPHP- Vulindlela Rural Enhanced People’s Housing Process

GEAR – Growth Employment and Redistribution Program

IFP – Inkatha Freedom Party

KZN – KwaZulu Natal

VDA – Vulindlela Development Association

R – South African Rand

RDP- Reconstruction and Development Progra

UDF – United Democratic Front

 

 

 

Introduction

 

‘What we are seeing here today is a community that has become what we have wanted. They have taken this mega project and made it their own. You are doing good work and you must continue to do so. You wanted houses built in a way you wanted and we as government obliged’`[1]~  President Jacob Zuma, Vulindlela 2016

 

 

In 1994, the newly elected ANC was faced with an acutely divided country with a severe housing crisis. In many peri-urban settlements, (housing areas that surround cities or towns that are neither urban nor rural and often consist of largely informal housing), including Vulindlela, community engagement and ‘bottom up’ development was adopted to help engage the community in developing their township and heal some of the divisions. This dissertation will focus on  the peri-urban settlement of Vulindlela, which is situated in KwaZulu Natal on the outskirts of the city of Pietermaritzburg.[2] In 2011 the Vulindlela Development Association (VDA) received 2 billion Rand of government funding to build houses for residents of Vulindlela.[3] This was the largest housing subsidy ever given in South Africa. The Vulindlela Housing Development project is an example of an unsuccessful attempt to improve a peri-urban area through housing development and community engagement. The project was intended to be a community-led ‘bottom up development’ and the VDA endeavoured to ‘address the alleviation of poverty, enhance community participation and transfer skills.’[4] However, it became wrought with allegations of corruption and worker protests, alongside many of the houses being demolished in 2014 because of poor quality. I will consider the success of engaging a divided community in the Vulindlela Housing Development Project. The project illustrates the conflict between private enterprise, municipal government and the community, that took place in many development projects in South Africa between 1996 and present day. The violence and forced removals of the apartheid era created a fragmented community with a high poverty rate, which remains a challenge for the ANC today.

There has been a general historical consensus in post-apartheid South Africa that peri-urban areas like Vulindlela need to be redeveloped to create greater equality and social mobility. As Morris and Hindson acknowledge, cities and social resources need to become more accessible to the peri-urban community.[5] Nevertheless given the divisions in society and the inadequate budget available, it remains to be realised what the best approach to redevelop these areas is, and whether it is possible to create something that will re-empower ( by which I mean to give authority or power to) the community. The historiography primarily agrees that ‘top down’ housing has had limited success and a bottom up approach to development needs to be taken in South Africa. The key debate centres on whether bottom up development can be successfully applied to South Africa’s communities and if it has been used effectively to redevelop the housing in peri-urban areas in past 20 years.

Most historians are now critical of the neo-liberal ‘top down’ approach to housing, but there is some acknowledgement of the successes of the policy. Neo-liberal ideas were prominent at the end of apartheid and during the period of transition. The government originally saw the solution to the housing shortage as a ‘top down’ approach based on a market driven economy and government housing strategies which was applied across communities.[6] Although the government’s Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), which was a socio-economic policy that attempted to combine development, modernisation, redistribution and reconciliation into a unified programme, did place particular emphasis on the importance of rural development and community empowerment, it did not go far enough.[7] Under this neo-liberal approach, government subsidies were offered to the poorest in society and generous incentives were provided by the state to banks, aiming to encourage investment in housing developments. However Marie Huchzemeyer, who has written numerous books on South African housing development, advocates that the neoliberal approach was overly simplistic,  market-oriented and failed to overcome race and class-based spatial inequalities.[8] The diversity and complexity of South African settlements meant that applying a nationwide housing model to divided and unsettled communities was unlikely to be successful.

Instead Huchzemeyer and David Pottie are proponents of ‘bottom up,’ decentralised, local development. Huchzemeyer argues  the ‘top down’ development and centralised housing policy of the 90s led to the limited ability of housing development to address resident realities and imposed administrative constraints on community projects.[9] David Pottie supports community-led development, which he argues the ANC saw as helping to ensure  sustainable service delivery to peri-urban communities, whilst promoting social and economic development and encouraging the involvement of communities in local government.[10] Pottie maintains that community development encourages transparency and helps to prevent the profit margins of big corporations being prioritised over the requirements residents.[11] However, both Pottie and Huchzemeyer fail to address the divided nature of the South African homelands. The divided nature and history of violence in the Vulindlela Valley, means that we must reflect on whether in this divided settlement community engagement can be achieved.

Furthermore, within divided communities bottom up development can create conflict.  Lawrence Piper and Bettina Von Lieres argue in a disaffected community engaging citizens in public decision-making often creates clashes.[12] Piper contends that forms of community engagement within development projects in peri –urban areas like Vulindlela, have not worked because rather than providing opportunities for genuine community engagement with local leaders, they tend to be sites for capture by political elites.[13] The reasons for this include poor implementation by officials, but most importantly, among political elites there is a lack of commitment to community participation. This appears to be because of the history of indirect rule in KwaZulu Natal, which has created a precedent for non-elected traditional leaders (the amakhosi) to make decisions on behalf of the populace of their region. However, does this mean that ‘bottom up development’ is not successfully applicable to peri-urban areas, as the Vulindlela example suggests, or does it simply mean that what may be perceived as ‘bottom up development’ is in fact still being controlled by political elites and ‘top down’?

This dissertation will consider how community engagement has been utilised in South Africa to re-integrate the Bantustans into the cities and improve conditions and facilities.  The first chapter will outline the ANCs housing policy and interrogate the historiographical views on bottom up development. The second chapter will look at the case study of the Vulindlela Housing Development Project and the problems of engaging the black community in the Bantustan homelands in the development of new houses. I will discuss the broader political context of the need to re-incorporate peri-urban areas into the city and improve services, and illustrate why community engagement in the project was important, but ultimately failed because of corruption from the traditional elites overseeing the project.[14] Finally in the third chapter, I will demonstrate how the needs of the people are often lost in the power game that occurs between private companies and local elites, but with careful management and consideration of what the residents need, ‘bottom up’ development can be a success.

I will draw on primary evidence to help evaluate the success of bottom up development in Vulindlela, using sources to show how community engagement came into conflict with private enterprise in Vulindlela. I rely heavily on primary sources, due to the limitation of the little secondary literature written on Vulindlela itself. To supplement this, I have consequently considered the example of Vulindlela in the context of secondary literature on housing development in peri-urban communities in South Africa. My sources are predominantly a collection of newspaper articles from the early 2000s, discussing the Vulindlela Housing Development project. I have endeavoured to regard these sources critically because of media bias and compared them to accounts and reports about Vulindlela.  Ultimately through utilising my sources and relating them to the historiography I will demonstrate the difficulties the government has faced since 1996 in re-empowering the Bantustans and uniting a divided community in a community development project.

 

 Chapter 1: The ANC’s approach to the South African housing crisis and the legacy of apartheid in peri –urban communities

Re-empowering the marginalised and healing the community divisions of apartheid has been a recurrent theme in the ANC’s post-apartheid rhetoric. However, in the late 1990s and early 21^st century, South Africa remained deeply divided. An article in the Guardian found that in 2012, 43.5% of South Africans rarely or never speak to someone of another race. [15] In the post-apartheid era despite government attempts at reconciliation there were divisions between races and ethnicities, and frequent outbreaks of xenophobic attacks in squatter settlements. Noor Nieftagodien attributes the outbreaks of violence to the struggle over limited resources, which has generated attitudes of xenophobia and exclusion.[16] However, this explanation is too simplistic and fails to account for other factors that have created tensions including economic decline, South Africa’s history of violence and the recent increase of migrants from Zimbabwe in South Africa. The ANC has attempted to promote democracy and reduce the division, but the post-apartheid violence that encapsulated many communities has created a climate of fear and mistrust. This has lead historians to question the possibility of uniting diverse communities and re-powering the marginalised in the last 20 years. In this chapter I will explain why South African peri-urban communities have become home to the marginalised and need re-empowering. I will then analyse the different housing strategies pursued by the ANC since 1996. ‘top down’ housing delivery strategies have had limited success, and the government has increasingly placed emphasis on decentralised public development, which gives the marginalised a say in their own communities.  However, the failure to address some of the problems with bottom up development has limited its success in development projects.

Peri-urban communities have become home to the marginalised because influx control laws, overurbanisation and a declining economy, forced the poor black communities into peri-urban areas. I chose to focus on peri-urban communities because they were the areas that frequently lacked access to proper housing, employment opportunities, services, and following apartheid had some of the highest poverty levels. Furthermore, 95% of residents living in peri-urban settlement are black,[17] and providing proper housing in peri-urban areas could heal the racial divisions of apartheid and help reduce poverty. Peri-urban communities originated in the 60s and 70s, resulting from the state’s withdrawal of housing provisions and people building their own settlements on the outskirts of towns. [18] The growth of peri- urban informal settlements is also liked to the wider economic decline in 1970s Africa. Freund explains that in the 1960s and 1970s the urban population of African cities boomed.[19] Rapid urbanisation outstripped the availability of jobs and housing in the cities and poor communities settled on the outskirts of towns in slums and shanty towns.  In South Africa this process was expedited by segregation and forced removals, which forced black Africans into homeland communities outside of the cities. [20] The regulations of the apartheid era and the tumultuous economic and political period which preceded it, resulted in the accumulation of informal and formal peri-urban areas on the edge of cities.

The redevelopment of peri-urban areas was also seen as important in the post-apartheid era to heal ethnic divides and re-empower the black populace. Peri-urban Bantustan communities having historically been black areas, are traditionally afflicted with high poverty rates and insufficient, poorly built slum housing. A Bantustan was an area dictated in apartheid policy that was set aside for black inhabitants. Bantustans were generally situated away from cities and had a limited access of resources, resulting in high unemployment and poor living conditions in these areas. Under influx control apartheid rules, rural Africans were excluded from family accommodation in urban areas and many moved to peri-urban areas.[21] This created a pattern of migrant labour and a shortage of opportunities for work in the peri-urban areas. Therefore, when the ANC came to power they were faced with the challenge of how to end the marginalisation of these communities and re-empower them.

There are various debates concerning the problem with informal housing, with many residents preferring it to government housing. The problem with informal or shack housing is that it is usually constructed illegally from whatever materials are available, including mud and corrugated iron, and they do not usually comply with local building codes.[22] Subsequently, this creates safety risks.  Furthermore, informal shacks typically lack the amenities that normally accompany a dwelling. They are often without running water  and many peri-urban settlements only received access to electricity after the 1976 Soweto uprising.[23] Considering the violent history of these areas one problem with informal settlements is the lack of safety and privacy  they provide. [24] As a result, shack settlements are characterised by high crime rates, and it was in the interest of the government in 1996 to reduce crime and increase safety by providing its residents with proper housing.

For the ANC housing provided a solution to the violence in the homelands, which has been linked by historians to a struggle for land and resources and has resulted in divided and disjointed Bantustan communities.[25] As Morris and Hindson note, the end of the apartheid era was marked by a struggle for resources and rapid urbanisation.[26] The conflict between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party raged in the homelands in the late 80s and early 90s. Many townships set up ‘Self – Defence Units’ or SDUs, which were township militias created to ‘protect’ their inhabitants from attack. Mathis explains how most historiography agrees that the one of the main causes of faction fighting in the Bantustans was the shortage of land and resources.[27] The apartheid state relegated the majority of the black population to a very small percentage of the land creating a struggle for resources.[28] With the power of the chiefs dependent on their control over land and their ability to grant land to new subjects, land shortages created a crisis in political authority which lead to recurring outbreaks of violence.[29] Housing was seen as a potential solution to reducing and preventing violence, as the community’s involvement in developing the housing would reduce rifts through the promotion of democracy.

The importance of community engagement is due to the failure of top down development to create housing that meets the people’s needs. Various approaches have been taken to managing the housing crisis, but initially the government adopted a ‘top down’ nationwide scheme that had limited success. Housing provision has been a major priority for the ANC government ever since its election in 1994. Under apartheid, the experience of service provision and delivery was determined by race and housing type and location.[30] The 1996 Constitution decrees that the state has a responsibility for the ‘progressive realisation’ of ‘adequate housing.’[31] The ANC initially adopted a neo-liberal ‘top down’ approach to development based upon Keynesian free market policies.[32] Neo-liberalists saw the solution to the housing crisis as incorporating poor families into the capitalist economy using a state-housing subsidy system, which provided families with an asset that allowed them to get onto the property ladder. An early advocate of the neo-liberal approach was the Urban Foundation, a public policy think tank funded by the private sector, which was disbanded in 1995. [33] The Urban Foundation inspired a monolithic housing policy based on a one-off capital subsidy perpetuated through the Housing White Paper.[34] The ‘National Housing Subsidy Scheme’  was set up by the ANC to provide poor households that met certain conditions with state housing, providing ownership of a newly-built residence.[35] However, the problem with having a single policy is that it does not account for the different needs of each area and community.

Whilst the ‘top down’ approach has provided housing, there have been serious deficiencies in the housing produced.  The neoliberal top down approach did have some success. The government built around 2.6 million houses between 1994 and 2008.[36] Between 1994 and 1998 the number of houses connected to electricity in South Africa rose from 31% to 63% and the number of telephone lines doubled.[37] However, the ‘top down’ approach involved outsourcing housing development to private developers; R8 billion was invested by financial institutions in housing development projects between 1986 and 1990. This largely resulted in poor housing and ultimately defaults on housing bonds which is estimated to involve around 50,000 bonds.[38] By 1999 it was clear that the housing created since 1994 was mostly substandard and not located within the reach of amenities, services and employment opportunities.[39] Ultimately however, the ANCs ‘top down’ development and centralised housing policy has led to limits in the ability of housing development to address local problems.[40]

    The failure of a ‘top down’ approach led to a re-evaluation of housing development and a greater focus on ‘bottom up’ approaches to the housing crisis. The ANC increasingly began exploring bottom up development strategies in the late 90s, particularly since 2004, with the policy amendment to the 1994 White Paper, ‘Breaking New Ground,’ which focused on the role of local government, informal settlement upgrading, and engaging the community.[41]

Bottom up’ housing development in South Africa refers to the decentralisation of housing provision to local governments and communities. Decentralisation addresses the disconnection between the ANC government and local communities, by allowing for the consideration of both outsider and local perspectives to development. [42] The reasoning behind this is that local governments and their own communities have the best understanding of the needs of the community, in terms of housing provision. The knowledge of the community is combined with funding from the state, as well as provisions such as safety regulations. Community-based development helps to empower communities so that they take action and become less dependent.[43] NGOs like Planact ( whose aim is to bring about local integrated development for the poor)[44] have  engaged in community development projects and the ANC have tried to encourage community development through decentralisation. One example of this is the ANCs incremental housing strategy, which was adopted from 1997 and involved the upgrading and consolidation of informal settlements.[45] This new approach saw informal housing as part of the solution rather than the problem to the housing crisis in the townships.[46] Therefore, by the early 2000s decentralised approaches involving local government and sometimes local communities were increasingly being adopted to tackle the housing crisis.

Bottom up housing development has clear benefits in South African communities.Lawrence Piper explains that ‘participatory governance’ has become popular in South Africa and is seen as good for citizenship because it creates a space for political agency and promotes democracy.[47] Following the abolition of the apartheid, the ANC  has attempted to institutionalise public participation through various ‘invited spaces.’[48] Public participation was a way of informally involving the bottom of society in democracy and giving them a change to engage in the reshaping of South Africa. Furthermore, David Pottie’s convincingly voices the view that, community engagement is central to transparency and evading corruption a central tenancy in so many of South Africa’s housing projects, including in Vulindlela.[49] Bottom up development engages marginalised communities in the democratic process and politics, by giving them a say in the future of their settlement.

In a fragmented community, community engagement is important to help understand the needs of the people and reduce conflict. However, with a history of violence and division from not only the ‘white urban city,’ but political divisions within themselves, is it possible to unite a peri-urban community in a successful project? [50]  Trade Unionist, Jeremy Baskin believes the starting point for all planners is to ban the word ‘community’ – a ideological term that masks the harsh, and sometimes unpleasant, reality of the situation that they are dealing with.[51] The political conflicts in Vulindlela, which will be discussed in Chapter 2, are deeply embedded in society and as a result, a careful balance needs to be created between managing the involvement of the community, the private sector and the local elites in development projects.

Therefore, a single top down approach to housing development does not consider the complex, different communities in South Africa which have developed from its political and ethnic divisions. Consequently, community engagement and a decentralised approach to housing has increasingly been seen as the best approach to promote democracy and give marginalised peri-urban communities a say in their future. However, the divides that remain in communities and the history of power struggles in peri-urban communities, means that community engagement in the last 20 years has not always been a success.

 

Chapter 2: Community engagement in Vulindlela, a fragmented peri – urban community: the product of the apartheid era.

    Vulindlela still suffers from the legacy of the apartheid era. The violent war that engulfed the area during the early 90s has left deep scars and unrest in the community, along with destroying many people’s homes and families. Consequently, Vulindlela appeared to be an ideal candidate for community ‘bottom up’ development because of the fragmented, impoverished nature of the community, which was plagued with a history of violence. It was thought that housing would help to re-empower the community and reduce the impact of the poverty. In this chapter I will illustrate how Vulindlela became divided and argue that housing development was crucial to re-empowering the community and reducing unrest, but the history of violence made it difficult to unite the community in a development project.  ‘Bottom up’ development appeared to be the solution to Vulindlela’s housing crisis but it ultimately failed. The difficulties of community engagement illustrate the problems homeland communities face and the conflict between traditional elites, political elites, the public, and private enterprises in development projects.

 

The apartheid government, the National Party, laid the groundwork for the growth of poor peri-urban Bantustan communities with insufficient houses or services. Vulindlela is a peri-urban community that lies on the edge of Pietermaritzburg, but it expanded considerably during apartheid because of forced removals, the process by which, the apartheid government forcibly moved 3.5 million black South Africans from white designated areas between 1960 and 1983.[52] In doing this, the apartheid government removed the black workers’ chance to earn a living and divided communities by forcing them to move into new areas with insufficient housing.[53] In 1946, roughly 66 per cent of the black African population of Pietermaritzburg district lived in those western areas which were to become the Vulindlela district.[54] However, by 1985 this figure had risen to 80 percent, as black Africans forced out of white areas settled in Vulindlela.[55] This ‘displaced’ urbanization was partly the result of state policies aimed at limiting normal urbanization and keeping the city for the white population.[56] Therefore, the apartheid government laid the groundwork for these communities that were unable to provide for themselves, as the black population were forced into the homelands, often leaving behind their jobs, homes and livelihoods.

The need for housing development and the impact of the apartheid era is clearly evident in Vulindlela in the early 21^st century. Vulindlela lacked the services and opportunities to be sustainable, as its disjuncture and distance from the Pietermaritzburg limited its inhabitants’ access to employment and services. In 1989, more than 70% of the African population in Vulindlela lived in mud houses, the majority of which were without electricity or water.[57] Additionally, Vulindlela had high unemployment rates, which resulted from the zoning laws that restricted blacks from living in Pietermaritzburg. In his report on Vulindlela, Norman Bromberger states that the average household income in Vulindlela in 1981 was just 180 Rand per month, in 1981 that was the equivalent of around £103 a month.[58] In 1988, up to three quarters of those in employment commuted to Pietermaritzburg due to a shortage of jobs in the Vulindlela area.[59] Pietermaritzburg was a segregated city and in the black peri-urban areas there was an ‘extreme under supply of formal housing’ with a proliferation of backyard dwellings and shacks.[60] Vulindlela’s impoverishment is therefore very much a product of its history under apartheid.

Community engagement and housing development is important in Vulindlela, because of the deep political tensions that remain following the extreme political violence of the 1980s and 1990s, stemming from a shortage of housing and resources. The case study of Vulindlela is situated in a wider political conflict that took place between the ANC and the Inkatha Freedom Party in the 1990s. Vulindlela was largely under the control of Inkatha Cultural Liberation Movement (before it became a political party), but Vulindlela was also a pocket of United Democratic Front  (ANC aligned) support in the 1980s & early 1990s.[61] Vulindlela was a site of conflict because the main road to Pietermaritzburg ran through it. Mxohliso Mchunu describes his experience of growing up in Vulindlela in the late 1980s and early 1990s. `He describes hiding in a stream for 8 hours as a child to avoid being killed by Inkatha during the Seven Days War,’ which started on the 25 March 1990.[62] The conflict was between the UDF and the IFP and resulted in the deaths of over 80 people and 20,000 were left homeless.[63] Hindson and Morris argue that a lot of the violence had roots in the deprived conditions of the homelands and the struggle for resources, individuals within communities engaged in violent against each other, rather than against the state.  In Vulindlela, young men did not have the same opportunities as their fathers to become migrant workers or work on their own farms and this anger was redirected against rival political groups.[64] The mistrust within the community and the housing crisis therefore has its origins in the violence of the 1980s and 1990s, which destroyed many houses and created a culture of fear.

In the Vulindlela Valley, social violence became an acceptable means of achieving social hegemony. Urbanised communities increasingly engaged in violent conflict against each other,[65] and violence was increasingly seen as the way to secure political change.[66]

Community engagement was seen as a way to involve the local people in politics and heal political division which tore apart families. In his PhD thesis Mxolisi Mchunu, describes the tensions in the late 1980s between his parents and his uncle who wanted them to join Inkatha.[67] The upper reaches of Vulindlela were Inkatha strongholdsduring the war in Pietermaritzburg in the 80s & 90s. These wards remained under Inkatha control until a local government election in 2011, which was won by the ANC.[68] In the aftermath of the election 65 people were arrested for public violence in the Vulindlela area.[69]  Following this election, the Vulindlela Housing Development Project emerged. Therefore, community involvement in this project was crucial to dispel political tensions, and the newly elected ANC were under political pressure to deliver. Through engaging all the township in the project the local government can help heal those political divisions and encourage the poorest to have their voice heard, promoting democracy which is still a fledgling concept in South Africa.

A community-led housing project was the best option for the development of the impoverished and divided state of Vulindlela. Housing provides a means to escape the poverty cycle, as householders can take in family and have a secure residence on which to fall back.[70] According to Lemanski, homeownership in capitalist economies is seen as a sign of prosperity and a strategy to combat poverty, as the government provides housing recipients with a stake in the property market.[71] Similarly, Bond argues that owning a house improves family health and hygiene and provides privacy.[72] Housing also provides stability and security. As Vulindlela was the site of a violent civil war, security was seen as very important. Trade UnionistJeremy Baskin argued that the high levels of organisation could be channelled from defence and violence into development.[73] However, given Vulindlela’s distance from Pietermaritzburg, housing could not provide the jobs or financial security that the people of Vulindlela so desperately needed.

The Vulindlela Rural Housing Project is significant because it was the largest single project in the history of the national housing subsidy scheme. In 2011, the KwaZulu Natal Department of Human Settlements signed off 2.1 billion R for 25,000 houses in the Umgungundlovu District Municipality. It is also an example of a time where the government attempted to work alongside the local community to bring about bottom up housing development.[74] The project is a ‘Rural Enhanced People’s Housing Process Project’(EPHP), which meant the recipients are involved in the decision-making process.[75] The Vulindlela community established the Vulindlela Development Association (VDA), to oversee the project over a period 5 years, within 9 wards within the Vulindlela Traditional Council, and under 5 amakhosi (traditional tribal leaders who have been incorporated into government). This Vulindlela Housing Project was intended to: be community based, alleviate poverty, enhance community participation and transfer skills to Vulindlela’s inhabitants. The VDA described the project as ‘encapsulating the principles of community participation’ through the participatory approach to deliver integrated human settlements.[76] However, the project fell short of achieving many of its goals, and the level of community involvement is questionable.

The project was not an unmitigated disaster, but it ultimately failed to provide for its people’s needs. As of the 23^rd of June 2016 the Vulindlela Housing Development Project has created 12,300 houses many of which have been upgraded from tin shacks to real brick homes.[77] Furthermore, according to reports the project has created 1,832 full time jobs for the local community and taught construction skills from which members of the community can benefit.[78] However, once the project ends, whether these people will be able to find alternative jobs in the local area is unclear.  In 2015, it was reported that Msunduzi Municipality is set to have two more wards by next year’s local government elections. This follows a submission by the Municipal Demarcation Board for more wards to be created within Msunduzi Municipality. Under the approved proposal, a new ward will be created in Vulindlela. Democratic Alliance and Inkatha Freedom Party councillors objected to the tabled report but were outvoted by the ANC at the sitting.[79] Therefore, the redevelopment and incorporation of Vulindlela is still underway. However, the Vulindlela example exemplifies how the political violence and the forced removals that encapsulated the homelands during Apartheid and the post-apartheid era created a fragmented community, and the struggle to reintegrate peri-urban areas remains a problem in South Africa today.

 

Chapter 3: What can we learn from Vulindlela? Has community development been a failure in South Africa’s peri-urban communities?

The Vulindlela EPHP illustrates the delicate balance that needs to be maintained between the public, political groups and the local government, when developing a peri-urban community. The needs of the people are often lost in the power game that takes place between private companies and local elites. Vulindlela is one example where community engagement has not worked, but this is not a prerogative for future development projects and instead illustrates potential weaknesses with ‘bottom up’ development that need to be managed to help make community engagement a success.

The Vulindlela housing project failed to unite the community and provide housing needs, subsequently not fulfilling the needs of the community by addressing the poverty crisis. According to the newspaper ‘Ground Up’, many of the houses were demolished in 2014 because they were considered poor quality, and built badly. There were also reports that some residents have no access to water near their homes.[80] In November the Pietermaritzburg press reported that a ‘blind man, Ernest Mdunge, had to walk three kilometres to fetch water.’[81]  Mr Ddunge’s house with holes in the roof and a pit toilet is a far cry from the ANC promise to deliver ‘integrated development planning and funding alignment.’ In Vulindlela houses have been provided, but the services to accompany them have not. Furthermore, the project was meant to be completed in 2015, but the completion date has now been extended to 2018.[82] Although, it must be noted that there are budget limitations, and the houses should be of sufficient quality that they do not need to be demolished within 4 years. Overall, the Vulindlela housing development project failed to deliver adequate housing that the people wanted.

The reason the Vulindlela Housing development project failed was not because it was a community development project, but because it failed to suitably involve the community and consider their housing needs. According to Melinda Silverman (a Senior Lecturer in Urban Design at the University of Cape Town), in South Africa the problem is not the housing delivery but instead the state’s misinterpretation of housing need.[83] Without transport or sufficient employment opportunities, the provision of houses has little benefit to breaking the poverty cycle in former Bantustan communities. Silverman explains that in some extreme cases people have to sell their houses, because having a house does not automatically reduce poverty.[84] The house needs to be in a good location with access to amenities and infrastructure, good proximity to transport routes and employment opportunities. This is true to some extent as one of the main problems in Vulindlela is an employment shortage, however there have also been issues concerning the delivery of houses in Vulindlela.

Housing provision in South Africa has predominantly been in the form of RDP houses, which were houses originally produced as part of the Reconstruction and Development Program. The houses were characterised by their small uniform appearance, and have been criticised for being poorlybuilt without the necessary amenities. Government investigations found that the RDP housing system had been abused, as countless private sector contractors had built substandard houses and didn’t properly train people under the people’s housing programme.[85] Some of the houses were so badly constructed they collapsed and the houses were too small.[86]These houses come with freehold, but a freehold is of little benefit when the ability to search for work may be valued more highly than property ownership.[87] The government has restricted RDP owners further by making it illegal to sell their houses for 8 years, meaning that if residents are unable to get work within a commutable distance they often have to choose between a job or a house.[88] In a recent news article, President Jacob Zuma condemned the selling of RDP houses, arguing that people sell on their houses because they fail to appreciate the amount of work that goes into producing them.[89] Zuma argued that contrastingly, the people of Vulindlela would not sell their houses because the community was involved in the process of building the houses and understood the work that was put into it.[90]  However, if the houses were of good quality and suited the people’s requirements they would not want to sell them. The problem lies with the houses themselves and not the owners’ understanding of how they were constructed.

 

Yet in South Africa and Vulindlela did the people actually want RDP houses? Did they know what they wanted? The project which was ironically meant to help reduce unrest, resulted in multiple outbreaks of violent protest and strikes. Many residents protested against the project, but there seemed to be no clear consensus of what residents wanted. Claire Bénit levels the following criticism at community led development in South Africa; she argues that by targetingpublic aid towards narrower categories of the population the government has created social divisions and weakened the community of informal dwellers instead of enhancing their interest in land servicing and local development.[91] When the community is not united, it’s hard to achieve a consensus of what the people want, and projects can end up fulfilling the needs of the few who shout loudest rather than the many.  As Jo Beall argues, in South Africa it is often the case that unless the poor and excluded mobilise in large numbers, they find it hard to access decision-making arenas.[92] In terms of development the marginalised have remained relatively powerless.

Whilst community engagement was intended to prevent corruption, the Vulindlela housing development project was plagued with accusations of corruption. In Vulindlela there were protests that a huge amount of state funding was entrusted to a private company (Dezzo Holdings) without it going to tender.[93] Were the private organisations being prioritised over the needs of the community? Local elites involved in the VDA housing project are shareholders in Dezzo Holdings and could be seen to be acting in their own personal interest by not allowing the project to go to tender.[94] However, the amakhosi claimed that the EPHP had a provision that allowed for the project not going to tender.[95] This draws parallels with David Pottie’s argument that in South Africa many development decisions have been settled in favour of private sector profit margins over the residents’ needs. [96] In so-called community development projects, how much are the community actually being involved? The Vulindlela example demonstrates the dangers of private sector involvement in development projects; community engagement is important to increase transparency and help to reduce the risk of corruption. One newspaper even claimed that the amakhosi used some of money earmarked for the project to buy 4 wheel drive cars,[97] and there were accusations of workers not being paid due to corruption.[98] Therefore as Lawrence Piper, notes when public contributions in local governance are restricted to ward committees and local leaders, with little encouragement for citizens to participate, housing projects will simply become an opportunity for elite exploitation.[99] Handing over the project to local elite or committees does not necessarily result in the consideration of the community’s needs.

The Vulindlela protests indicate the lack of involvement the community feel that they have been given in the project, and the failure of the project to reduce division between the public and political elites. In 2012, barely a year after the project began, workers at the KwaGezubuso site put down their tools and complained about the lack of transparency in the project.[100] On the 15^th of July 2011, the community mobilised residents and marched in protest in an attempt to block the housing project, until their demands for transparency had been heard.[101] Rather than reducing public, unrest the project was creating it by dividing the VDA, the amakhosi and the local people.  Peter Alexander argues that on the surface, recent protests in South Africa appear to be against service delivery and self-regarding leaders of municipalities. However, Alexander argues that there grounds for tracing service delivery protests back to the apartheid era and the realities of persistent inequality.[102] Since the early 2000s, state service delivery has caused a mounting upsurge of localised community protests.[103] This implies that when communities are divided, ‘bottom up’ development may not be the solution, but could potentially result in more conflict.

However, does this mean that ‘bottom up development’ is not successfully applicable to peri-urban areas, as the Vulindlela example suggests, or does it simply mean that what may be perceived as ‘bottom up development’ is in fact putting control in the hands of a few elites? There is still a tradition of inequality in the homelands where historically power was concentrated in the hands of a few elites, often dubbed ‘apartheid collaborators’ because they utilised the apartheid tensions to their own advantage. As Thabo Mbeki noted at the National Council of Provinces in 2005, ‘This unseemly scramble for political power in municipal government appears to be driven by the desire to abuse elected positions to lay hands on the economic resources that the local authorities have the possibility to access.’[104] This is because rather than providing opportunities for genuine community engagement with local leaders, community development projects became controlled by political elites trying to assert their power, or gain access to state funding for their own means. Furthermore, the often overarching influence of the amakhosi who are not democratically elected, and the incorporation of traditional authorities into contemporary developmental local government, reflects the previous system of indirect rule in which the British used the amakhosi to work on their behalf and subjugate their fellow Africans.[105] By giving the amakhosi a large role in development the ANC risks undermining the very principle of participatory governance and democracy which community development projects such as the Vulindlela EPHP endeavour to promote.  The project can still be regarded as bottom up because it was orchestrated by a local committee, but I would argue the project itself did not involve the community enough to be regarded as a community project.

However, the elites are not entirely to blame, the history of violence and ethnic tensions of the apartheid and early post-apartheid era are hard to shake, with a pattern of indirect rule continuing that the ANC has done little to challenge.  The legacy of the long-running ‘civil war’ (1990-1994) between Inkatha and the ANC, in which 20,000 black South Africans died, seems imbedded into KwaZulu Natal with frequent incidents of resurgent violence.[106] The cycle of violence continued into the late 90s because there was no clear legitimate legal system and accountability for crimes.[107]Despite the premise of democracy there has remained an undercurrent of violence. Bill Berkley argues that in the South African homelands ‘one lesson has been learned by all: violence works.’[108] It had become a norm for elites to gain power through the use of violence. In the years following the end of apartheid, Inkatha’s electoral wins in rural Kwazulu-Natal have occurred in the context of forceful intimidation over many years, whilst the ANC used similar strategies in the townships.[109] In the 21^st century the landscape of violence has declined but rivalries between political parties continue,[110] and the idea of ‘settling scores’ very much remains, preventing communities from moving forward.[111] Therefore ‘bottom up’ development can only help heal the violent scars of apartheid if the money it provides is put in the hands of the residents, and not corrupt elites and warlords who continue to fuel the violence by maintaining inequality, corruption and violent rivalries.

The Vulindlela EPHP casts doubts on whether there is a place for bottom up housing development in South Africa in the future. As I have established, one the main problems in Vulindlela was the overarching influence of the amakhosi, but this problem has been managed in Durban where community engagement has achieved success through careful management of political tensions in Durban.[112] Durban was also a site of conflict between the ANC and IFP in the 1990s.[113] In Durban the council incorporated outlying chieftaincy area and the ANC council successfully brought development houses to the peri-urban chieftaincy areas, and gained the support of chiefs who had previously backed Inkatha. Similar to Vulindlela, where the amakhosi were significantly involved in the Vulindlela EPHP, in Durban the amakhosi are included in traditional local governance structures.[114] The 1997 White Paper states that in regard to traditional authorities and development, ‘a co-operative relationship will have to be developed.’[115] The White Paper presents the amakhosi as having mediator roles in local disputes, and working with the council to provide development.[116] Professor of Development, Jo Beall argues that in Durban the amakhosi have been encouraged to participate in the formal systems of local government and become agents of urban development.[117] Furthermore, through engaging in forums with the amakhosi 15 peri-urban areas and their traditional leaders were incorporated into the Durban city council.[118] Therefore it has been possible to manage the influence of the amakhosi in housing development projects and work with them to provide a positive outcome.

Nonetheless, residents lack of understanding of development projects and how they can get involved with the project is a clear problem. In the peri-urban settlements surrounding Durban, few people were aware of the eThekwini Metropolitan Council and the its role over development projects. Instead, over 65% of people instead associated developmental projects with the amakhosi.[119]  For developmental community led housing projects, people need to be aware of the correct avenues to get their voice heard

 

Conclusion

 

The Vulindlela Housing Development Project demonstrates that South Africa has continued to struggle with the legacy of apartheid. The history of violence has left its mark on communities, leaving them fractured, disjointed and prone to recurrent violence. Peri-urban communities and informal shack settlement are hallmarks of the inequality and housing crises that engulfed South Africa in the latter half of the 20^th century. In many of these settlements violence became the norm, and an accepted route to achieving power. In the new post-apartheid era, housing was seen as a constitutional right and a means to reducing violence and inequality.[120] However, the acknowledgement of the different requirements of individual communities, coupled with a desire to engage the poorest in society in the developmental process and give them a say in their future, has increasingly led to a more decentralised bottom up approach to development.

In South Africa ‘top down’ development has failed to account for the complexities of South African peri-urban communities, and consequently community engagement and a decentralised approach to housing has increasingly been seen as the best approach to give the marginalised peri-urban communities a say in their future. Community development is democratic and provides residents with the opportunity to engage in participatory governance. However, as I have demonstrated ‘bottom up’ development has had some success in peri- urban communities on the outskirts of Durban. However, what has become clear is that engaging the community in a housing development project is only successful, if firstly the community are made aware of the project and the role they can play. Secondly the needs of the community must be considered alongside the feasibility of the project, and lastly the power and money must be put in the hands of the people or a democratically elected committee, not traditional elites. Bottom up development only appears to work if there is transparency at all times in the project and careful management between the different parties involved in the project, in particular private enterprises and the elites. If the ANC wants to present itself as a party for the poor, then it needs to put their needs above that of private enterprise and traditional authorities. Whilst Zuma may have lauded the project a success in 2016, I would argue that the inhabitants of Vulindlela would largely disagree.

The Vulindlela Housing Development project exhibits some of the potential problems with community. Until the project is finished it is problematic to make a premature judgement, however the amakhosi’s control of the project, corruption and the lack of transparency led to further anger from the people within the community, who have expressed frustration at their lack of involvement.’ The power of political elites, and ordinary people’s lack of awareness of the democratic process and their ability to be involved in the project, has restricted their influence over what happens within the community. The pattern of indirect rule has remained prevalent since the abolition of apartheid, because the power has predominantly been placed in the hands of non-democratically elected traditional leaders and powerful businessmen and elites, rather than the people. If the project is correctly executed, community engagement gives the marginalised a sense of agency and encourages democracy in a country that for so long has operated under an oppressive state.

Ultimately, I propose that the South African Government has not listened to its people and provided the housing delivery that considers their needs. The housing element of the ANC’s Reconstruction and Development plan, has largely been unsuccessful. The ANC has mass produced houses all over the country without considering the individual needs of each community.  For example, in Vulindlela, access to employment was the most important aspect to the local community, therefore transport to Pietermaritzburg was a priority. Part of the problem is that many of the communities are situated in areas that just do not have the employment opportunities to sustain them. Is it logical for the government to build houses in unsustainable communities, or should they instead encourage people to move elsewhere where they would have greater opportunities and services available to them? The legacy of forced removals and influx control means that there remains a large level of animosity against the state dictating where people should live. However, as Vulindlela is remotely located and does not have good transport links and the employment opportunities that Pietermaritzburg provides, housing alone could not have re-empowered the community. The people require good, safe transport links and employment opportunities in order to make their homes of benefit to their wellbeing.

Fundamentally, the problem of South Africa’s divided peri-urban spaces has not been solved within the last 20 years. Racial and political divides continue to run deep and inequality has grown, with historically marginalised groups still remaining very much on the margins of society. The ‘top down’ housing approach failed to tackle these divides and differences by applying a country-wide scheme that was not applicable to all. Whilst community engagement has helped to tackle the housing crisis and provide jobs and skills to the locals in construction, in the case of Vulindlela, its divided nature has enabled the amakhosi to manipulate the situation to serve their own ends. Consequently, the housing project has largely failed to provide the community with what they need. Ultimately, the challenge to bring stability and improve conditions in Vulindlela continues.

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[1] Singh, Kaveel, ‘Zuma Proud Of ‘Mega’ Housing Project In KZN,’ News24, 2017 <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-proud-of-mega-housing-project-in-kzn-20160623> [accessed 27 March 2017]

[2] Ibid

[3] ‘BESG – Built Environment Support Group – Case Study In Housing Intervention: Vulindlela Rural Housing Project,’ Besg.Co.Za <http://www.besg.co.za/human-settlements/case-study-in-housing-intervention-vulindlela-rural-housing-project.html> [accessed 11 April 2017].

[4] “Vulindlela Development Association (VDA)”, Vulindlela.Org.Za, 2017 <http://vulindlela.org.za/about_vda.html> [accessed 14 April 2017].

[5]Morris, Mike and Doug Hindson, “South Africa: Political Violence, Reform and Reconstruction”, Review of African Political Economy, 19 (1992),43-59, (p.58)

[6] Bénit, Claire, “The Rise Or Fall Of The ‘Community’? Post-Apartheid Housing Policy In Diepsloot, Johannesburg”, Urban Forum, 13 (2002), 47-66, (p.63)

[7]  Robert Cameron, “The Reconstruction And Development Programme”, Journal Of Theoretical Politics, 8.2 (1996), https://doi.org/10.1177/0951692896008002009, 283-294, (p.284)

[8]  Huchzermeyer, Marie, “Housing for The Poor? Negotiated Housing Policy In South Africa“, Habitat International, 25 (2001), https://doi.org/10.1016/s0197-3975(00)00037-0,  303-331 (p. 330)

[9]Ibid, p.303.

[10] Pottie, David, ‘Local Government and Housing in South Africa: Managing Demand And Enabling Markets,’ Development In Practice, 14 (2004), 606-618, (p.610)

[11]Ibid, p.614

[12] Laurence Piper and Bettina von Lieres, ‘Inviting Failure: Citizen Participation and Local Governance In South Africa,’ Citizenship DRC Special, 1.1 (2008), 1-22, ( p.2)

[13] Laurence Piper and Bettina von Lieres, ‘Inviting Failure: Citizen Participation and Local Governance,’ p.20

[14] Workers march Vulindlelaville,’ Witness, (30^th August 2012) http://www.besg.co.za/images/2013Uploads/VulindlelaMedia/Workers march Vulindlelaville – Witness 300812.pdf, [accessed 1 January 2016]

[15]  David Smith, ‘South Africa Still A Chronically Racially Divided Nation, Finds Survey,’ The Guardian, 2017 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/06/south-africa-racially-divided-survey> [accessed 5 April 2017].

[16] Noor Nieftagodien, ‘Xenophobia’s local genesis: historical constructions of insiders and the politics of exclusion in Alexandra Township’ in L Landau (eds) Exorcising the Demons Within: Xenophobia, Violence and Statecraft in Contemporary South Africa (2012), 109-34, p.109

[17] Ibid, p.8

[18] Beall, Jo, et al, ‘Uniting a Divided City: Governance and Social Exclusion in Johannesburg,’ (Earthscan Publications Ltd: London, 2002), p.59

[19] Bill Freund, The African City, 1st edn (Cambridge [England]: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p.63

[20]Ibid, p.148

[21] Bek, David, Tony Binns, and Etienne Nel, ‘Catching The Development Train’: Perspectives On ‘Top-Down’ And ‘Bottom-Up’ Development In Post-Apartheid South Africa’, Progress In Development Studies, 4 (2004), https://doi.org/10.1191/1464993404ps047oa, 22-46, (p.43)

[22] Scott Matheson, ‘The Informal Housing Crisis in Cape Town and South Africa,’ (unpublished Undergraduate, The Ohio State University, 2011), https://kb.osu.edu/dspace/bitstream/handle/1811/48953/1/Senior_Thesis_Paper.pdf, 1-36, p.2

[23] Jo Beall, Owen Crankshaw and Sue Parnell, Uniting A Divided City, 1st edn (London: Earthscan, 2002), p.159

[24] Scott Matheson, ‘The Informal Housing Crisis In Cape Town And South Africa,’ p.2

[25] Sarah, Mathis, (2013), ‘From warlords to freedom fighters: political violence and state formation in Umbumbulu, South Africa’ African Affairs 112 (448): 421-439, (p.428)

[26] Morris, Mike and Doug Hindson, “South Africa: Political Violence,’ p.46

[27] Sarah, Mathis, ‘From warlords to freedom fighters,’ (p.428)

[28] Ibid, p.428

[29]Ibid, p.428

[30] Jo Beall et al, Uniting A Divided City, p.151

[31] Goebel, Allison and Belinda Dodson, ‘Housing And Marginality For Female-Headed Households: Observations From Msunduzi Municipality (Pietermaritzburg, South Africa): Canadian Journal Of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines: Vol 45, No 2, 2012 <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/ref/10.1080/00083968.2011.10541055?scroll=top> [accessed 17 January 2017], 240-272, (p.242)

[32]  M, Napier, ‘Housing Problem In South Africa: Ideological Perspectives,’ Forum, 2 (1993), <http://research.ncl.ac.uk/forum/v2i1/Housing%20Problem%20in%20South%20Africa.pdf> [accessed 1 January 2016], 22-27, (p.25)

[33] Huchzermeyer, Marie, ‘Housing for The Poor,’ pp.307-8

[34] Ibid, p.312

[35] Charlotte Lemanski, “Moving Up The Ladder Or Stuck On The Bottom Rung? Homeownership As A Solution To Poverty In Urban South Africa”, International Journal Of Urban And Regional Research, 35.1 (2010), <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2427.2010.00945.x>, 57-77, (p.58)

[36] Melinda Silvermann & Tanya Zack, ‘Housing delivery, the urban crisis and xenophobia,’ Hassim S., Kupe T. and Worby E. (eds.), Go Home or Die Here: Violence, Xenophobia and the Reinvention of Difference in South Africa, Witwatersrand University Press, 2008, 147-161, (p.148)

[37]Bek, David, Tony Binns, and Etienne Nel, “‘Catching The Development Train’: Perspectives On ‘Top-Down’ And ‘Bottom-Up’ Development In Post-Apartheid South Africa”, Progress In Development Studies, 4 (2004), <https://doi.org/10.1191/1464993404ps047oa> (22-46), p.25

[38] Patrick Bond ‘Do Blacks like Shacks?’, in ‘Cities of Gold: Townships of Coal,’ Patrick Bond, (African World Press: Trenton, 2000), p.279

[39] Bénit, Claire, ‘The Rise Or Fall Of The ‘Community? Post-Apartheid Housing Policy In Diepsloot, Johannesburg,’ Urban Forum, 13 (2002), p.63

[40]  Huchzermeyer, Marie, “Housing for The Poor? p.303.

[41] Breaking New Ground,’ Department of Housing, (2004), http://abahlali.org/files/Breaking%20new%20ground%20New_Housing_Plan_Cabinet_approved_version.pdf, [accessed 1 January 2017]

[42] Laurence Piper and Bettina von Lieres, “Inviting Failure: Citizen Participation And Local Governance In South Africa”, Citizenship DRC Special, 1.1 (2008), 1-22, (p. 3)

[43]Ibid, p.9

[44] ‘Vision, Mission & Values,’ Planact, 2017 <http://www.planact.org.za/about-us/vision-mission-values/> [accessed 23 April 2017].

[45] Patrick Bond ‘Do Blacks like Shacks?’ in ‘Cities of Gold: Townships of Coal,’ Patrick Bond, (African World Press: Trenton, 2000), p.262

[46]Ibid, p.262

[47]  Laurence Piper and Bettina von Lieres, ‘Inviting Failure,’ p.4

[48] Laurence Piper and Bettina von Lieres, ‘Inviting Failure,’p.20

[49] Pottie, David, ‘Local Government and Housing in South Africa’, p.610

[50]  Laurence Piper and Bettina von Lieres, ‘Inviting Failure,’ p.4

[51]Jeremy Baskin, ‘Phola Park’ (Johannesburg, 1993), http://www.saha.org.za/collections/planact_records.htm, 115, p.8

[52] “South Africa: Overcoming Apartheid”, Overcomingapartheid.Msu.Edu, 2017 <http://overcomingapartheid.msu.edu/multimedia.php?id=65-259-6> [accessed 17 April 2017].

[53]  John Laband and Robert Haswell, Pietermaritzburg 1838-1988: a new portrait of an African city, (Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press and Shuter & Shooter, 1988), p.71

[54] Ibid, p.71

[55] Ibid, p.71

[56] Ibid, p.71

[57] Ibid, p.72

[58] Norman Bromberger,’ African household incomes in Vulindlela,’ Carnegie Conference Paper no. 272, p. 2

[59] John Laband and Robert Haswell, Pietermaritzburg 1838-1988: a new portrait of an African city, p.42

[60] Ibid, 43

[61] Truth & Reconciliation Commission, Victim Hearing – November 1996, Pietermaritzburg – testimony of John Aitcheson, accessed on 10/02/17, http://www.sahistory.org.za/topic/truth-and-reconciliation-commission-trc

[62] Mxolisi Mchunu Mchunu, ‘A History of Political Violence In Kwashange, Vulindlela District And Its Effects On The Memories Of Survivors’ (unpublished PhD, University of KwaZulu Natal, 2013). 1-340, (p.82)

[63] Ibid, p.92

[64] Mike, Morris and Doug Hindson, ‘South Africa: Political Violence,’ 47

[65] Ibid, p.47

[66]Ibid, p.54

[67] Mxolisi Mchunu, ‘A History Of Political Violence In Kwashange’ (2013), p.86

[68] ‘Workers march Vulindlelaville,’ Witness, (30^th August 2012) http://www.besg.co.za/images/2013Uploads/VulindlelaMedia/Workers%20march%20%20Vulindlelaville%20-%20Witness%20300812.pdf, [accessed 1 January 2016]

[69] Mlondi Radebe, “Vulindlela: Police Arrest 65 Ward 5 Protesters For Blocking Road”, News 24, 2011 <http://www.news24.com/Archives/Witness/Vulindlela-police-arrest-65-Ward-5-protesters-for-blocking-road-20150430> [accessed 1 April 2017].

[70] Charlotte Lemanski, “Moving Up The Ladder Or Stuck On The Bottom Rung?’ p.58

[71] Ibid, 58

[72] Patrick Bond, ‘Elite Transition: From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa,’ (London: Pluto Press, 2014), p.95

[73]Jeremy Baskin, ‘Phola Park’ (Johannesburg, 1993), http://www.saha.org.za/collections/planact_records.htm, 115, p.8

[74] BESG, House From The Vulindlela Housing Development Project <http://www.besg.co.za/human-settlements/case-study-in-housing-intervention-vulindlela-rural-housing-project.html> [accessed 21 April 2017].

[75] President Zuma To Visit Vulindlela Rural Housing Project To Celebrate Housing Milestone, The Presidency”, Thepresidency.Gov.Za, 2016 <http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/content/president-zuma-visit-vulindlela-rural-housing-project-celebrate-housing-milestone> [accessed 1 April 2017].

[76]  ‘Overview of the Vulindlela Rural Housing Project,’ http://www.besg.co.za/images/2013Uploads/VulindlelaMedia/Overview%20of%20the%20Vulindlela%20Rural%20Housing%20Project.pdf, [accessed 1 January 2016]

[77] President Zuma to Visit Vulindlela Rural Housing Project to Celebrate Housing Milestone, [accessed 1 April 2017].

[78] Ibid

[79] Public Eye Maritzburg, ‘Two More Wards For Msunduzi,’ 2017 <http://publiceyemaritzburg.co.za/18596/two-more-wards-for-msunduzi/> [accessed 12 February 2017].

[80] Nompendulo Ngubane, “Blind Man Has To Walk Three Kilometres To Fetch Water”, Groundup, 2016 <http://www.groundup.org.za/article/ruled-gangs-life-manenberg/> [accessed 6 February 2017].

[81] Ibid

[82] Nontokozo Gxumisa, “Over 1800 Jobs Created By Vulindlela”, The New Age, Online Newspaper South Africa, 2016, <http://www.thenewage.co.za/over-1800-jobs-created-by-vulindlela/> [accessed 1 April 2017]. p. 1

[83] Melinda Silverman, Tanya Zach, ‘Housing Delivery,’ p.147

[84] Ibid, p.149

[85] Failed Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) Housing Projects Are Under Housing Rectification Programme | South African Government”, Gov.Za, 2009 <http://www.gov.za/failed-reconstruction-and-development-programme-rdp-housing-projects-are-under-housing-rectification> [accessed 4 April 2017].

[86] Ibid

[87] Melinda.Silvermann, & Tanya Zack, ‘Housing delivery, the urban crisis and xenophobia,’ p.149

[88] Thulani Gqirana, “Govt Seeks To Discipline Those Selling RDP Houses”, Mail & Guardian, 2015 <https://mg.co.za/article/2015-06-08-govt-seeks-to-discipline-those-selling-rdp-houses> [accessed 22 April 2017].

[89] Sabelo Nsele, “Zuma Slams Those Who Sell RDP Houses”, News24, 2016 <http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/zuma-slams-those-who-sell-rdp-houses-20160623> [accessed 3 April 2017].

[90] Ibid

[91] Bénit, Claire, “The Rise Or Fall Of The ‘Community’? p.56

[92] Jo Beall, ‘Cities and Development,’ p.224

[93]  Mike Morris and Doug Hindson, ‘South Africa: Political Violence,’ p.43

[94] Nokuluna Ngobese, ‘Suspend the project’ Maritzburg Echo   (21^st July 2011)http://www.besg.co.za/images/2013Uploads/VulindlelaMedia/Suspend%20project%20-%20Maritzburg%20Echo%2021July2011.pdf

[95] George, Mari, ‘Why The Vulindlela Tender stinks’ (2011), http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/why-the-vulindlela-tender-stinks–da-kzn, [accessed 1 January 2016]

[96] Workers march Vulindlelaville,’ Witness, (30^th August 2012) http://www.besg.co.za/images/2013Uploads/VulindlelaMedia/Workers%20march%20%20Vulindlelaville%20-%20Witness%20300812.pdf, [accessed 1 January 2016]

[97] Nathi Olifant, “Zuma Visits R3bn Rural Housing Scheme In Kwazulu-Natal”, Sowetan LIVE, 2017 <http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/news/2016/06/23/zuma-visits-r3bn-rural-housing-scheme-in-kwazulu-natal> [accessed 14 April 2017].

[98] Cameron, Brisbane, ‘Back-Door Deals in Vulindlela’ (2011),in ‘The Witness’ http://www.besg.co.za/archive/98-launch-of-the-deepening-democracy-projects-14-may-2010.html, [accessed 1 January 2016]

[99] Laurence Piper and Bettina von Lieres, “Inviting Failure,’ p.20

[100] ‘Vulindlela workers down tools,’ Echo  (30^th Aug 2012), http://www.besg.co.za/images/2013Uploads/VulindlelaMedia/Vulindlela%20workers%20down%20tools%20-%20Echo%2030Aug2012.pdf, [accessed 1 January 2016]

[101] ‘Residents demand transparency’ The Witness   (15^th July 2011) (http://www.besg.co.za/images/2013Uploads/VulindlelaMedia/Residents%20demand%20transparency%20-%20Witness%2015July2011.pdf

[102] Peter Alexander, ‘Rebellion of the Poor: South Africa’s Service Delivery Protests – A Preliminary Analysis’, Review of African Political Economy, 37, 123 (2010), 25–40, p. 25

[103] Marcel Paret, ‘Violence and democracy in South Africa’s community protests,’ Review of African Political Economy, 2015, Vol. 42, No. 143, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2014.995163, 107–123, (p.108)

[104] Thabo Mbeki, National Council of Provinces, 2005, quoted in, Glen Hollands, “Corruption In Infrastructure Delivery: A South African Case Study,’

<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/57a08c2340f0b652dd001130/WEDC-SA-case-Conf-Presentation.pdf> [accessed 2 April 2017].

[105] ibid, 467

[106] Bill Berkley, ‘The New South Africa: Violence Works’ World Policy Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1996/1997), p.74

[107]Ibid, p.75

[108] Ibid, ‘The New South Africa: Violence Works,’ p.80

[109] Ibid, ‘The New South Africa: Violence Works,’ p.79

[110] S. M. Mathis, “From Warlords to Freedom Fighters,’ p.421

[111] Jo Beall, Sean Fox,’ Cities and Development,’ (New York: Routledge, 2009), p.223

[112] Jo Beall, ‘Cultural Weapons, Traditions, Inventions and The Transition to Democratic Governance in Metropolitan Durban”, Urban Studies, 43 (2006), 457-473, p. 459

[113] Jo Beall, ‘Cultural Weapons,’ 457

[114] Jo Beall, ‘Cultural Weapons,’ 457

[115] Ibid, 457

[116] Ibid,’ 462

[117]Ibid,’ 457

[118] Ibid, 459

[119] Ibid,’467

[120] Charlotte Lemanski, “Moving Up The Ladder Or Stuck On The Bottom Rung? p.58